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ON HUSSERLIAN EIDETIC VARIATION AND ITS DUPLICITY: 
“CONTINGENCY-VARIATION” 
OR “SIMILARITY-VARIATION”? 
Daniele De Santis* 
To V. 
 
Whoever deals with the issue of eidos in Husserl’s phenomenology 
cannot repress an uncomfortable sensation due to the fact that, if on 
the one hand the Husserlian Denkweg unfolds itself unitarily, at least 
at the level of a certain number of basic methodological acquisitions 
(and eidetic analysis is to number among these), on the other hand 
the emergence of eidetic variation marks a decisive passage within 
the Husserlian conceptuality and methodology. Passage that usually, 
however, seems to remain unperceived: not rarely the two termi- 
nologies – we mean “eidetic reduction” (Ideas I) and “eidetic varia- 
tion” – are considered as two different expressions of just a unique 
method to obtain the intuition of essence. It is on the contrary our 
firm conviction that, if both reduction and variation aim to lead the 
phenomenological gaze to grasp the eidos, they cannot be superim- 
posed and taken in a synonymic way: if the task remains the same in 
fact, the second comes into play in order to offer a methodological 
response to what the former leaves without a truly suitable solution. 
In such an investigation aiming at clarifying what eidetic variation 
should mean, our starting point (our only methodological assump- 
tion) will lie in those texts (mainly Experience and Judgement) where 
the eidetic variation openly appears: in this way we hope to 
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preliminarily identify its inner structure. Once fixed all its consti- 
tuting elements (I), only whose presence should authorize to think of 
it, (II) we will try to verify whether it is possible to speak of two 
different physiognomies of eidetic variation, of two different ways to 
conceive of variation and of what it is expected to vary. 
I. 
§ 1. Remarks on the Eidetic Reduction in Ideen I 
 
Already in the introduction to Ideas I Husserl distinguishes pheno- 
menology and psychology by presenting the former as “a science of 
essences (as an ‘eidetic’ science)” whose corresponding methodological 
instrument is a reduction: “The relevant reduction which leads over 
from the psychological phenomena to the pure ‘essence’ [...] is the 
eidetic reduction”1. In § 2 he opens the reasoning by unfolding an inner 
overturning of factuality, that is by showing how “fact” cannot but 
reveal itself as “essence”. In the argumentative form this becomes 
particularly evident where Husserl makes use of the word Wesen 
(essence) to directly describe the Tatsachen, that is in the very moment 
in which he has not yet performed any reduction – in which, to say it 
better, he should not be yet able to speak of essence. Individuality 
means thus, “with respect to its essence [seinem Wesen nach]”, “some- 
thing factually existing spatiotemporally, as something that is at this 
temporal locus” but that “could just as well have been at any other 
temporal locus”; “Individual existence of every sort is, quite univer- 
sally speaking, ‘contingent’. It is thus; in respect of its essence it could be 
otherwise [o.i.]”2. Husserl himself recognizes his strategy: “When we 
said that any matter of fact, ‘in respect of its own essence’, could be 
otherwise, we were already saying that it belongs to the sense of 
anything contingent to have an essence and therefore an eidos which can be 
apprehended purely; and this eidos comes under eidetic truths belonging 
to different levels of universality”. That allows him to assert that, 
phenomenologically, “Experiencing, or intuition of something indivi- 
dual can become transmuted into eidetic seeing (ideation) – a possibility 
which is itself to be understood not as empirical, but as eidetic”3. 
                                                     
1. Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologische Forschung. Erstes Buch: 
Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie, hrsgg. von K. Schumann, Husserliana III/1, 
The Hague, M. Nijhoff, 1976, p. 4; English trans. by F. Kersten, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Pheno- 
menology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenome- 
nology, The Hague, Boston, Lancaster, M. Nijhoff, 1982, p. xx. 
2. Ibid., pp. 9-10; English trans., p. 7. 
3. Ibid., p. 10; English trans., p. 8. 
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The Husserlian strategy consists in remarking at the same time 
analogies and differences between eidetic and empirical intuition. 
The result is that Husserl, not in spite of, but in light of these efforts, 
cannot conceive of eidetic intuition but on the model of the empirical 
one. The fact that he, in describing “factuality”, cannot but anticipate 
– to its being not yet intuitively grasped – the notion of Wesen, 
testifies, beyond all the appeals to the possibility of a “transmutation” 
of a fact into an essence, not simply to a lack of method, but to the 
fact that the question itself of the passage to the eidetic attitude does 
not appear as a problem altogether: the impression is that the eidetic 
intuition is consequence of a blunt change of attitude4 which cannot 
to be able to guarantee that what in such a way is obtained is really 
an essence and not the empirical generalization from the individually 
given right now.  
Let us come back to the text. Husserl ends § 3 by remarking once 
again the reciprocal foundation between fact and essence, at the same 
time making a reference to the “consciousness of an exemplar” (as 
Exempel) that will be of fundamental importance in the method of 
variation:  
 
Certainly its own specific character is such that intuition of essence has its 
basis a principal part of intuition of something individual [...]; certainly, 
in consequence of that, no intuition of essence is possible without the free 
possibility of turning one’s regard to a “corresponding” individual and 
forming a consciousness of an exemplar [eines exemplarischen Bewus- 
stseins] – just as, conversely, no intuition of something individual is 
possible without the free possibility of bringing about an ideation and, in 
it, directing one’s regard to the corresponding essence exemplified in what 
is individually sighted. 
 
But if the intuition of essence is connected to the empirical one to 
such an extent that, without the empirical corresponding indi- 
viduality the phenomenologist cannot turn his gaze towards an 
essence, hence we cannot obtain the essence if this latter is not 
already (and previously) realized into a single factual individuality. 
To say it radically, the phenomenologist has no possibility of 
                                                     
4. See “The Basic Problems of Phenomenology” in Husserl, Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjek- 
tivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass. Erster Teil: 1905-1920, hrsgg. von I. Kern, Husserliana XIII, Den 
Haag, M. Nijhoff, 1973, p. 126; English trans. by I. Farin and J. G. Hart, The Basic Problems of 
Phenomenology . From the Lectures, Winter Semester, 1910-1911, Dordrecht, Sprinter, 2006, p. 17: 
“One grasps the idea and the pure universality precisely in an attitude of its own, differently 
directed looking and intending. […] To conclude, by our being in the a priori attitude, we grasp ideas, 
essences [o.i.]”. Also p. 151; English trans. p. 42: “And about all these things I have now made 
assertions, I have made perceptual judgments, and I constantly make new ones. That is the 
natural attitude. Now I change, as it were, my viewpoint. I achieve a new attitude [o.i.]”. 
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describing an essence whose realisation he has not yet empirically 
experienced, and on which performs eidetic reduction. 
But what about phantasy? Husserl states at the beginning of § 4 
that “The eidos, the pure essence, can be exemplified for intuition in 
experiential data – in data of perception, memory, and so forth; but it 
is equally well exemplified in data of mere phantasy”5: “In this 
connection, it does not matter whether anything of the sort has ever 
been given in actual experience or not. If, by some psychological 
miracle or other, free phantasy should lead to the imagination of data 
(sensuous data, for example) of an essentially novel sort such as 
never have occurred and never will occur in any experience”. It is 
amazing that “free phantasy should lead to the imagination of data 
[...] of an essentially novel sort such as never have occurred and never 
will occur in any experience” – but it is amazing too that this would 
be only due to “some psychological miracle or other”. The reference 
Husserl makes to phantasy does not come then in conflict with what 
we argued: it means on the contrary that it makes the phenome- 
nological inquiry free from whatsoever Tatsache and Aktualität affect- 
ting perception, but it is conceived just as a possible starting point 
upon which the phenomenologist can develop eidetic considerations, 
the other starting point being obviously perception. It just furnishes 
material to submit to eidetic gaze, namely to the change of attitude.  
Even if we suddenly switch to § 70, we cannot but repeat the just 
asserted: “It is of the universal essence of the immediately intuitive 
seizing upon essences that (as we have already emphasized) it can be 
effected on the ground of a mere presentification of exemplificative 
single particulars. Presentification, e.g., phantasy, however, as we have 
just explained, can be so perfectly clear that is makes possible a per- 
fect seizing upon essence and a perfect eidetic insight [o.i.]”6. Here, 
again, phantasy is what makes possible, near to perception, “a perfect 
seizing upon essence and a perfect eidetic insight”; and in fact, 
considered as presentification, it is equated to whatever other form of 
Vergegenwärtigung. Of course, perception has a certain privilege due 
first of all to its giving in originality, but, as well-known: “There are 
reasons by virtue of which in phenomenology, as in all eidetic 
sciences, presentifications and, more precisely, free phantasy acquire a 
position of primacy over perceptions”7. At this very moment of the 
                                                     
5. Hua III/1, p. 12; English trans., p. 11. 
6. Ibid., pp. 129-130; English trans., pp. 157-158. 
7. Ibid., pp. 130-131; English trans., p. 158. “The popular concept of phantasy, however, does not 
refer just to the sphere of artistic phantasy [...]. At least, a narrower and, to be sure, very common 
concept of phantasy, which psychology has taken up under the title of productive phantasy, 
stands in close relation to this sphere. Productive phantasy is phantasy that gives from 
voluntarily; it is precisely phantasy in this sense that the artist particularly has to use. However, 
one must distinguish two further concepts here, one wider and one narrower, depending on 
whether or not one understands the voluntariness of the forming in the sense of free imagining 
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reasoning Husserl evokes the model of the “investigative thinking of 
geometer” by comparing it with the phenomenologist. This latter 
 
too can use the resource of originary givenness only to a limited extent. To 
be sure, in the mode of originary givenness he has at his free disposal all 
the chief typed of perceptions and presentifications as perceivable 
exemplifications for a phenomenology of perception, phantasy, memory, 
etc. [...] However, of course, he does not have examples for all possible 
particular formations any more than the geometer has sketches or model at 
his disposal for the infinitely many kinds of solids. Here, in any case, the 
freedom, of eidetic research also necessarily demands operating in 
phantasy8. 
 
What the excerpt asserts is the importance of phantasy in order to 
extensively furnish material for an eidetic description. What Husserl 
immediately writes after the aforementioned passage reinforces our 
doubt concerning the being confined of every eidetic intuition to 
single factual perceptions: “It is necessary to exercise one’s phantasy 
abundantly in the required activity of perfect clarification and in the 
free reshaping of phantasy-data, it is also necessary, before doing 
that, to fertilize one’s phantasy by observations in originary intuition 
which are as abundant and excellent as possible”. That – to quote one 
of the most famous passages – “‘feigning’ makes up the vital element of 
phenomenology as of every other eidetic science”, it is due to the fact that 
what phantasy offers as material for eidetic considerations does 
involve no position: it is neutral. And on such a neutrality we can 
perform eidetic reduction. That does not exclude that, on the 
contrary, we might decide to just make use of the outcomes of 
perception, in such a way avoiding any intermediation by phantasy. 
Furthermore, whether the very vital element of the eidetic inquiry is 
phantasy, and whether this latter has to be continually exercised and 
fertilized by always new perceptions of the individual, the risk is that 
this sort of investigation cannot exhaustively and eidetically describe 
but what has been already given (even though just one time) as 
individuality. 
Let us sum up the goals of this our brief commentary on Ideas I as 
follows: 
                                                                                                                            
(inventing). Certainly the historian also uses productive phantasy, phantasy that gives from 
voluntarily. But he does not invent. By means of form-giving phantasy on the basis of secured 
data, he seeks to outline a coherent view of personalities, destines, eras – a view of realities, not 
of things imagined”, Husserl, Phantasie, Bildbewusstsein, Erinnerung. Zur Phänomenologie der ans- 
chaulichen Vergegenwärtigungen. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1898-1925), hrsgg. von E. Marbach, 
Husserliana XXIII, The Hague, M. Nijhoff, 1980, pp. 3-4; English trans. by J. B. Brough, Phantasy, 
Image, Consciousness and Memory (1898-1925), Dordrecht, Springer, 2005, pp. 2-3. The interesting 
point is here that the phantasy the historian makes use of is mainly characterized for its being a 
presentification offering a non-actual data, rather than for its inventions and productions. 




• the eidetic intuition presents itself just as a mere and sudden 
change of gaze’s attitude;  
• in this way leaving up in the air the clear account for the relation 
connecting together 1) intuition of something individual 2) exempla- 
rity and 3) eidetic consciousness; 
• to phantasy is ascribed a role due to the way it neutrally offers 
something for an eidetic description; 
• the physiognomy of eidetic intuition is not simply thought on 
the basis of the empirical one: more deeply, it suffers of the impos- 
sibility in catching an essence that has not been already individually 
perceived, in such a way running the risk of anchoring every eidetic 




§ 2. Remarks on the Eidetic Variation in Erfahrung und Urteil 
 
2.1. The Methodological Role of Variation 
 
Among all the Husserlian texts we opt for Experience and Judgment 
(§§ 86-93) because it seems to offer the most organic and structured 
articulation of eidetic variation. The § 87 provides direct insights into 
the method of “eidetic seeing”. The first section (a) is on “free varia- 
tion as the foundation of essential seeing” and Husserl immediately 
asserts the necessity of preliminarily “freeing” the universality from 
the given contingency. This Befreiung is the “modification” of “an 
experienced or phantasied objectuality into an arbitrary exemplarity 
[Exempel]”9. The first transition is thus from contingency to exemplarity.  
The Faktum is now valid as Exempel, as a leading Vorbild offering 
itself for a “reshaping by pure phantasy”. And if the starting point is 
a Vorbild, what phantasy produces as variations in the course of the 
Umgestaltung are Nachbilder, that is “new similar images as copies”, 
“phantasy-images” “which are all concretely similar to the original 
image” (Ähnlichkeiten des Urbildes). They are the “variations” that we 
produce “freely and arbitrarily” and that, contrariwise to what one 
can think, do not directly concern, as variations, the eidos, but just the 
Exempel. We are in fact still in the realm of exemplarity, so that one 
should not speak of eidetic variation, rather only of exemplar varia- 
tion (with reference to what is varied). While what appears as differ- 
rent in the course of the variation remains “indifferent” it arises a 
“unity running through this manifold” of variations, namely the 
                                                     
9. Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil. Untersuchungen zur Genealogie der Logik, hrsgg. von L. Land- 
grebe, Hamburg, Felix Meiner Verlag, 1972, p. 409; English trans. by J. S. Churchill and  
K. Ameriks, Experience and Judgment, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1975, p. 340. 
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persisting of an “invariant” as “necessary and general form”: “This 
universal essence is the eidos in Platonic sense taken in purity and free 
from all metaphysical interpretations”. 
Naturally, adds Husserl in the following section (b), such a des- 
cription of variation “does not imply that an actual continuation to 
infinity is required, an actual production of all the variants – as if only 
then could we be sure that the eidos apprehended at the end is 
actually conformed to all the possibilities”. If it were so, there would 
be no distinction between the method of variation and the empirical 
generalities. In both cases we would be anchored to the factual 
individuality: “[...] just as each object has the character of exemplary 
arbitrariness, so the multiplicity of variations likewise has an arbitrary 
character”. What is obtained by consciousness is “that ‘I could conti- 
nue in this way’”, “and so on, at my pleasure”: “Only in this way is 
given what we call an ‘infinitely open’ multiplicity; obviously, it is 
the same whether we proceed according to a long process, producing 
or drawing on anything suitable, thus extending the series of actual 
intuitions, or whether we break off prematurely”. 
Switching to the third section (c) we realize that Husserl has still to 
show in what way we attain the eidos right in the middle of the 
manifold of variations. He remarks that “In this multiplicity [...] is 
grounded as a higher level the true seeing of the universal as eidos”. This 
is the second transition, the one from exemplarity to essentiality. Then 
comes the variation, described as a “transition” “from image to 
image, from the similar to the similar” in which “all the arbitrary 
particulars attain overlapping coincidence in the order of their appea- 
rance and enter, in a purely passive way, into a synthetic unity in 
which they all appear as modifications of one another”10. What here 
strikes is the equivalence Husserl settles on between image – and 
then variation as variation of images that at the same time are copies 
too –, and Ähnlichkeit, in this way arranging eidetic variation as a 
variation of similarities.  
At the end of the process of variation we grasp “the eidos as the 
ideally identical, which only is an hen epi pollon. [...] Only if we retain 
in grasp the earlier fictions [Fikta], as a multiplicity in an open 
process, and only if we look towards the congruent and the purely 
identical, do we attain the eidos”11. The passage confirms one point in 
particular: that along all the process of variation we have to take into 
account phantasy mainly with reference to the ontological status of 
the varied as Fiktum; this means that the Fikta plays the role of 
mediation between the staring point (Übergang from contingency to 
                                                     
10. Ibid., pp. 413-414; English trans., pp. 342-343. 
11. Ibid., p. 414; English trans., p. 343. 
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exemplarity) and the eidos (Übergang from exemplarity to essen- 
tiality). 
2.2. On Similarity 
 
It is in § 44 that Husserl develops an accurate analysis of both 
Gleichheit and Ähnlichkeit; analysis which, even though offered on the 
ground of an account for the passive synthesis of receptivity, already 
anticipates the future meaning of its outcomes12. Then a first descrip- 
tion of the process of grasping similarities which recalls the one 
aiming at the essence: “The contemplative running-trough changes 
into a succession of single apprehensions, and in the transition from 
apprehension to apprehension there comes to prominence for obser- 
vation [...] a foundation of similarity or likeness between this and 
that, as well as what is made dissimilar and unlike by contrast. The 
things which are common ‘coincide’, while those which are different 
separate”. It is question of a “coincidence in the objectual sense”. After 
such a preliminary, and common to both “similarity” and “likeness”, 
characterization, Husserl switches to an account for what more 
directly differentiates the former from the latter. Here a long but very 
clear extract: 
 
If the relation is one of mere similarity, then there is certainly still 
coincidence; the B-moment in question, which is perceived originally, 
coincides with the corresponding A-moment, still retained in the 
consciousness of the “still”. But the feature of similarity of A which is 
seen through the feature of similarity of B, and “coincides” with it, has a 
“gap”. The two moments are blended in a community; yet there also 
remains a duality of material separation, which is the separation and 
coincidence of what is “akin”. They do not go together to form a “like” but 
to form a pair, where the one is certainly “like” the other but “stands off” 
from it. [...] the difference still remains extant, despite the continuous 
transition13. 
 
Husserl goes on and explores the opposite case, the one of Un-
Ähnlichkeit, the “dissimilarity in pregnant sense”: “by this we do not 
mean a limited degree of similarity, a very slight of similarity, but the 
complete negation of similarity, which we will designate as hetero- 
geneity. It occurs when an intention towards homogeneity has pre- 
ceded and is disappointed, if, e.g., with the attempt at an overlap- 
ping coincidence, complete conflict takes place”. Husserl hastens to 
add that he cannot but leave open the question “whether such 
complete heterogeneity is in general possible at all”; or whether, in 
any case, it does not suppose a previous “community” only wherein 
it could occur. If then “dissimilarity” and “heterogeneity” are them- 
                                                     
12. Ibid, p. 224; English trans., p. 189. 
13. Ibid., pp. 225-226; English trans., pp. 190-191. 
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selves modes of Ähnlichkeit, they too have to play a role in that 
process of variation that we must name “similarity-variation”. 
It is then task of the following paragraph (§ 45) to deeper pene- 
trate the process along which we get similarities and dissimilarities 
and that in such a way offers a very concrete insight into the ways 
phantasy-variation proceeds. For the hitherto notions of similarity 
and likeness were “understood as concrete similarity and likeness, that 
is, similarity of concrete objects, as, e.g., a light red roof is similar to a 
dark red roof”. Next to this “concrete” conception, there is the “trans- 
ferred similarity”, the one considered “with reference to similar parts, 
and not similarity of the whole object, not similarity pure and simple. 
It is a specific relation in which concreta and wholes participate in a 
similarity in consequence of a similarity of the subordinate moments 
to which the similarity belongs”. 
One can argue that, while Gleichheit means an extreme case of 
concrete similarity, the Heterogeneität as Unähnlichkeit is an extreme 
case of transferred similarity so that they represent the two opposite 
poles of a whole spectrum of possibilities. 
 
If the similarity is concrete, that is, such that the concreta are similar 
through themselves, through their total What, and “coincide” as concreta, 
then the similarity certainly also belongs to each moment which we can 
distinguish in the related concreta; more precisely, we can separate the two 
concreta into “corresponding” moments, and if these moments are put into 
univocal coordination, the similarity belongs to each corresponding pair. 
The concrete similarity is thus resolved into partial similarities. But here the 
wholes are not similar “in consequence of” the similarity of the parts14. 
 
Husserl distinguishes a “primary” similarity of the concreta and a 
“secondary” similarity, the one through single moments belonging to 
the wholes: “We can also grasp this relation [secondary similarity] in 
such a way that we regard the similarity of the concreta as an actual 
similarity but as a similarity having a modified character, similarity 
‘based’ on the similarity of a [single moment]”. We have: “1. Total 
similarity, or pure similarity of the concrete wholes” and “2. Partial 
similarity, which is pure similarity of the parts but not pure similarity 
of the concrete wholes”. 
 
2.3. Difficulties of Similarity-Variation 
 
We can turn back to § 87 and to its fourth section (d) devoted to 
the relation between intuition of essence and experience of indi- 
viduals and where Husserl aims at clarifying the peculiar aspect of 
“essential seeing”. He makes clear the first feature, its “freedom”, by 
                                                     
14. Ibid., pp. 227-228; English trans., pp. 192-193. 
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virtue of an opposition to the “wholly determined commitment” of 
individual experience as well of phantasy insofar as this is conceived 
as experience in the mode “as if”: “In the free production of the 
multiplicity of variations, in the progress from variant to variant, we 
are not bound by the conditions of unanimity in the same way as in 
the progress of experience from one individual object to another on 
the ground of the unity of experience”. 
Husserl carries on the reasoning by a direct exemplification: “If, 
for example, we envisage to ourselves an individual house now 
painted yellow, we can just as well think that is could be painted blue 
or think that it could have a slate instead of a little roof or, instead of 
this shape, another one. [...] This house, the same, is thinkable as a 
and as non-a but, naturally, if as a, then not at the same time as non-a”. 
First remark: the example of the house is varied in the method of the 
concrete, or total, similarity-variation, that is according to the dissi- 
milarity of just an abstract moment (the “color” or the “little roof”). 
The second remark concerns the formal limits of the variation, i.e.,  
the Aristotelian principle of non-contradiction, by Husserl implicitly 
mentioned: “if as a, then not at the same time as non-a”. By such a 
reference, it should be clear how Husserl, despite of what he is going 
to affirm, does not step yet over the boundaries of the variation in 
direction of an eidos. If it were this the case in fact, being that principle 
the principle too of individuation, that would mean an extension of 
the principium individuationis on the realm itself of eide. And Husserl 
speaks in fact of something that “cannot be real while having each of 
them at the same time [o.i.]”. The discourse seems to still concern a 
reality. 
Husserl, however, deepens the reasoning and makes a step further 
to grasp the unity lying at the basis of what is real: 
 
[...] if this identical something determined as a exists, then a belongs to it 
in the cancelled form [durchstrichenen Form] of non-a, and conversely. 
To be sure, the identical substrate, is not an individual pure and simple. 
The sudden change is that of individual into a second individual 
incompatible with it in coexistence. An individual pure and simple is an 
existing individual (or one capable of existing). However, what is seen as 
unity in the conflict is not an individual but a concrete androgynous 
unity of individual mutually nullifying and coexistentially exclusive: a 
unique consciousness with a unique content, whose correlate signifies 
concrete unity founded in conflict, in incompatibility. This remarkable 
androgynous unity is at the bottom of essential seeing15. 
 
                                                     
15. Ibid., pp. 416-417; English trans., p. 345 [trans. modified]. We opt for “androgynous” instead 
of “hybrid” to better stress the underlying unity as well to recall a more Platonic language. 
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The Husserlian words themselves reflect the status of the andro- 
gynous by attributing to it features that have immediately to be 
retracted, as the one of individuality. Husserl certainly states that 
“the identical substrate, is not an individual pure and simple”; but in 
accounting for this “concrete androgynous unity” he ascribes to it the 
same logic he usually makes use of in describing the classical pheno- 
menon of a correction of an perception (“it is a human being”) by a 
second one (“it was just a mannequin”) which retentionally holds 
that former but only “in the cancelled form” (durchstrichenen Form). If 
it were so, namely if Husserl were authorized to speak of “unity of 
individual mutually nullifying and coexistentially exclusive”, that 
means that what entails these coexistentially exclusive possibilities, is 
not yet a realm of “pure possibilities” – which should only mean 
ideal, i.e. non-exclusive, possibilities –, but just “real possibilities” in 
the course of variation (hen epi pollon)16. Only of real possibility (“alle 
realen Möglichkeiten betreffen Unverträglichkeiten in der 
Tatsachenwelt” (Ms. D 12, 83b)) one can assert what Husserl asserts 
here of what should be a pure eidos (“This remarkable androgynous 
unity is at the bottom of essential seeing”): its being “unity of individual 
mutually nullifying and coexistentially exclusive”.  
If, then, our account and doubt are right, that means that Husserl, 
in spite of his claim, is not able to furnish an eidos which should not 
be a unity of real possibilities, but a pure possibility preceding 
(really) possible coexistence as well (really) impossible coexistence 
(“Freilich ist bei reinen Wesen Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit 
äquivalent” (Ms. D 8, 19a)). 
Let us represent anew the above recalled rhythms of the variation 
as follows: 
 
1) Faktum → 2) Exempel: reality as possibility17 → 3) Fikta → 4) hen 
epi pollon: underlying unity of real possibilities (reale Möglichkeiten)  
→ 5) ideal possibility (ideale Möglichkeit) 
 
At this point of the reasoning Husserl has not yet provided 5. It is 
to verify whether he is able to provide 4. 
The very reason lying at the basis of the difficulty of catching an 
eidos emerges properly speaking in § 93, where Husserl faces the 
                                                     
16. “Das konkrete Wesen ist das en epi pollon und zwar das vollständige Eidetisch-Identische der 
Mannigfaltigkeit individueller, kein weiteres Spezifisches ‘enthaltender’ Einzelheiten. Heben 
wir in diesem e{n, diesem konkreten Wesen, das ‘Quale’ heraus, so ist es für alle individuellen 
Einzelheiten absolut identisch. Es ist ein Wesensmoment, das in sich selbst absolut keinen 
Unterschied mehr enthält” (Ms. D 8, 27a).  
17. Husserl, Phänomenologische Psychologie. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925, hrsgg. von R. Boehm, 
Husserliana IX, Den Haag, M. Nijhoff, 1962, p. 74: “eine Wirklichkeit wird behandelt als eine 
Möglichkeit unter anderen Möglichkeiten”.  
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problem that “the establishment of the exemplarity to be varied 
already demands an intricate method”18. The very problem is that, 
taking as starting point of the whole operation of variation “a thing 
intended in the exemplary initial intuition”, this thing owns “an open 
infinity” and “only implicitly includes these ‘infinities’ in its 
intention, and in fact in such a way that each of these infinities, 
moreover, is entwined in a multiplicity of relativities”. Variation itself 
has to operate on such a relativity to grasp “the course of possible 
experience productive of intuition”, but the question finally touches 
the manner in which we became aware of the essence (“every single 
thing has its own essence”) in the course of variation: at what point can 
we assert with certainty that variation obtains the essence? 
This question may seem superfluous to whoever remembers that 
Husserl himself recognizes that it is not necessary a real and actual 
variation, but only a consciousness of Beliebigkeit. But, and here the 
problem arises anew, either in fact this consciousness of Beliebigkeit is 
sufficient at the very moment in which we attain the Exempel, in such 
a way rendering the operation itself of similarity-variation totally 
superfluous; or, to get the consciousness of Beliebigkeit, it is however 
necessary to operate variations (even if only one or two single 
variations), in such a way giving birth to the problem of where we 
have to locate the limit of these variations only whose achievement 
gives us the certainty of having obtained the Beliebigkeit19. But 
similarity-variation does entail no criterion to be certain of this fact 
and the consequence cannot be but the impossibility of being sure of 
having finally grasped an underlying unity, in this way switching 
from 3 to 4 – from continually different and divergent variations to 
the hen epi pollon.  
That means that this variation, not only does not seem to furnish 
ideal possibilities (“ein absolut reines Eidos” (Hua IX, p. 74)), but 
rather, if we take a closer look, it is also not able to offer the hen epi 
pollon. The three phases are, respectively, similarity-variation offering 
a manifold of variations; the hen epi pollon, or “eidos as the ideally 
identical”, providing an underlying unity to all those variations; 
finally the pure eidos, whose unity would be a pure possibility20.       
                                                     
18. Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil, op. cit., p. 437; English trans., p. 360. 
19. In one passage from the manuscript A III 11, 30a Husserl asserts that by just repeating “two” 
times the same content we grasp the underlying “unity”: “Wie es zunächst scheinen möchte, 
bedarf es nicht der offenen Unendlichkeit mit der Form des Usw. Es genügen schon 2 
Wiederholungen, um die Einheit zu erfassen”. Nevertheless, Husserl does not explain “why” 
that would be possible. He recognizes in fact that “[...] solange wir die einzelnen Gegenstände 
nicht im Bewusstsein der Beliebigkeit haben, im Bewusstsein des Exemplarischen, wir keine 
Selbstgebung haben”. 
20. Hua XIII, p. 215; English trans., p. 134: “There is a distinction to be made between the 
logically possible, the really possible and the factually possible under the given circumstances. 
[...] ‘What is logically possible’ is here the possible in the sense of the logic of nature, i.e., of the 
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Our critique is structured in two moments: 
 
• starting from what should represent the aim of the inquiry, 
namely the notion of “reines eidos”, we stress the difficulty of 
accounting for it in terms of “real possibilities” as well in the way 
Husserl describes it according to the paradigm usually adopted for 
perceptual corrections; 
• by moving backwards to “the eidos as the ideally identical”, we 
raise the difficulty of also catching the unity of this latter (the hen epi 
pollon), in such a way coming out of the infinite process of variation 
according to a methodological criterion that however cannot be 
found in it. 
 
On the basis of these critical remarks it comes into play the 
necessity of taking into consideration the second form of eidetic 
variation, the “contingency-variation” which, facing a limit under the 
shape of features that cannot be varied – under penalty of denying 
the ontological status of the object –, should be able to offer a 
methodological solution. It is for this reason that we cannot agree 
with D. Lohmar, who argues about the necessity of switching from 
“contingency-variation” to the one of similarity21. The disagreement 
has not only a theoretical reason – for it is the “similarity” to not offer 
a very, even if negative, criterion to halt variation –, but mainly 
textual: it seems to us that it is not possible to find the method of 
eidetic variation before Phänomenologische Psychologie (circa22), that is 
before its being arranged as similarity-variation.  
                                                                                                                            
pure science of nature, of the ontology of nature, to which geometry itself belongs. This logic 
explicates what is contained a priori in the idea, the essence of nature, the idea of space, of time, 
of the spatial-temporal thing, and of the encompassing context of nature. One idea implies more 
ideas [trans. modified]”. 
21. Dieter Lohmar, “Die phänomenologische Methode der Wesensschau und ihre Präzisierung 
als eidetische Variation”, Phänomenologische Forschungen, 2005, pp. 65-91: pp. 80-81: “Husserls 
Vorschlag einer Ähnlichkeits-Variation des Ausgangsexempels soll also die Schwierigkeiten 
beheben, die in der offenen Frage nach der Begrenzung der Variation liegt. Prinzipiell kann ich 
jeden beliebigen Gegenstand in einen anderen verändernd überführen, wie ist die Variation als 
begrenzt? Husserls Vorschlag in der Phänomenologischen Psychologie fordert die Ähnlichkeit der 
Varianten mit dem Ausgangsexempel”. 
22. See Roman Ingarden, Einführung in die Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls. Osloer Vorlesungen 
1967, hrsgg. von G. Haegliger, Gesammelte Werke 4, Tübingen, Max Niemeyer, 1992, p. 190: 
“Später, viele Jahre nach den Ideen I, nämlich im Jahre 1925, hat Husserl eine [andere, in 
gewissen Sinne ergänzende Theorie dazugefügt]. Ich habe im Jahre 1927 ein Manuskript von 
ungefähr 30-40 Seiten gesehen. Auf dem ersten Blatt stand mit blauem Bleistift geschrieben: 
‘Variation 1925’. Dieses Manuskript wurde später in das Buch aufgenommen, das nach dem 
Tode Husserls unter dem Titel Erfahrung und Urteil erschienen ist”. The 1925 manuscript in 
question could be the already quoted Ms. A III, 11 (Ad Allgemeines. Ideation, Variation. Exzerpt aus 
Formale und transzendentale Logik. In den Manuskripten über Verschmelzung etc. Zeitmodi und 
Urteilsmodi). In this manuscript the universality is connected to similarity to such an extent to be 
said ens similitudinis. It is then worthy of mention that it is in Oskar Becker’s Habilitationschrift 
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If it were so, it would be the “contingency-variation” to come later, 
and not the contrary. 
II. 
§ 3. Conclusion and Doubts: Does “Contingency-Variation” exist? 
 
The difficulty of raising the question of when the method of 
phantasy-variation as eidetic variation appears in Husserl, is due to 
the necessity of understanding whether we can claim to find it before 
the thematic emergence of the conceptual plexus eidetic variation. 
According to our analysis, this is not possible; or, better, it should not 
be possible if one does not want to run the risk of anticipating and 
superimposing later Husserlian reflections upon single appearances 
of “phantasy” or of “variation”. We are not allowed to do it for the 
simple reason that the method of “variation” as well the gnoseo- 
logical and epistemological value of “phantasy” are not something 
peculiar to Husserlian phenomenology as such. We cannot then 
proclaim its presence in front of each of their textual appearances. 
Properly Husserlian is phantasy-variation, neither variation nor 
phantasy. (That does not mean that Husserlian employment or 
account for them both is irrelevant or not peculiar). 
For what concerns the phantasy, the question seems to be easier 
for it is Husserl himself to recognize that we can find a direct evi- 
dence of it in the work of the geometer.  
With regard to the variation the fact is more complicated, mainly 
for a mathematical background of the concept of variation that here 
we are not able to directly follow (we just remind of the title of 
Husserl’s Ph. D. work, Beiträge zur Variationsrechnung). Beyond of this 
tradition, and even by just remaining within the limits of the two 
poles representing to a certain extent the Alfa and the Omega of the 
Logical Investigations – we mean Carl Stumpf and Bernard Bolzano –, 
we can already find technical employments of the method of varia- 
tion. It is present in Bolzano’s Wissenschaftlehre (notably § 147) as well 
in Stumpf’s Über den psychologischen Ursprung der Raumvorstellung.  
                                                                                                                            
(defended in Freiburg in January, 1922) that we can find the first public emergence of the 
method at stake. Here the passage: “Wir binden unsere Phantasie durch die Annahme (den 
‘Ansatz’) gewisser Merkmale und lassen dann die übrigen Merkmale frei variabel. Dabei stellen 
sich dann als unveränderlich, von der Variation nicht mitbetroffen finden, sind nämlich 
diejenige Merkmale, die mit den zunächst angesetzten notwendig mitgesetzt sind, deren 
Negation also zum Widersinn (materialer Art) führen würde. Das so entstehende Gemeinsame 
ist das ‘Eidos’ oder ‘Wesen’”, Oskar Becker, “Beiträge zur phänomenologischen Begründung der 
Geometrie und ihrer physikalischen Anwendungen”, Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänome- 
nologische Forschung, 6, 1923, pp. 385-560: p. 399. 
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This latter is of particular interest: for it is in fact right in the 
middle of probably the most quoted pages of this book where Stumpf 
introduces the well-known distinction between self-subsistent and 
partial contents, that he appeals too to the method of variation as 
“alteration” (Veränderung) of the absolute contents of a representa- 
tion. Stumpf argues that, in the case we succeed in separating two 
contents, it is sure that such contents are self-subsistent – but the 
contrary case in not true. Such inseparability could be due to a mere 
psychological incapability or to an associative habit to take them 
together as unity. We need for a more accurate verification: “We must 
not merely confine ourselves to consider the contents together and 
that they do not exist independent of one another; but also to the way 
they change [sich verändern] and act. It is evident that there exists here 
a way to take a decision”. Stumpf provides a direct example of 
relation between color and extension: “It is true in general that they 
change independent of one another [sich unabhängig verändern], 
namely that the extension can change while the color remains the 
same; and the color can change while the extension remains the same. 
Nevertheless the quality shares to a certain extent the change of the 
extension”23. 
In spite of the peculiar Husserlian attempt to attain, rather than a 
mere psychological analysis, purely ontological outcomes, the inheri- 
tance is undeniable24. Unlike what Husserl does in the Twenties, 
when Variation is distinguished from the notion of Veränderung, in 
both Philosophy of Arithmetic25 and the Third Investigation he makes on 
the contrary use of Variation, Veränderung and verändern in a synony- 
mic way. 
If variation as method is not something peculiarly characterizing 
Husserl, then – and even just for an interpretative prudence – one 
cannot hastily claim of having evidence of the eidetic variation by 
simply facing the word phantasy or variation. It is thus reasonable to 
assert that the eidetic variation appears in the course of the Twenties 
                                                     
23. Carl Stumpf, Über den psychologischen Ursprung der Raumsvorstellung, Leipzig, Verlag von S. 
Hirzel, 1873, p. 112. 
24. A comparison with Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen. Zweiter Teil. Untersuchungen zur 
Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis, Halle, Max Niemeyer, 1901, p. 228, makes clear how 
Husserl directly quotes Stumpf. The following manuscript from the Göttingen time shows the 
way Husserl employed this Stumpfian methodological principle to establish the independence 
between “change of quality” and “temporal-spatial shapes” to make clear the possibility of pure 
analysis, like the geometrical one: “Die Unabhängigkeit der idealen raumzeitlichen Vorkomm- 
nisse vom Wechsel der Qualitäten. Die Dauer, die Raumgestalt etc. bleiben absolut identisch bei 
Variation der Färbung etc. Diese Independenz ermöglicht eine reine Geometrie, Phoronomie, 
Zeitlehre. Die Independenz der Färbung von einer identisch festgehaltenen Figur. Die Möglich- 
keit eines Apriori in dieser Sphäre vermöge dieser Independenz: ideelle Reduktion auf den 
Limes: den reinen Farbenpunkt etc.” (Ms. D 13 II, 49b-50a). 
25. Husserl, Philosophie der Arithmetik. Mit ergänzenden Texten (1890-1901), hrsgg. von L. Eley, 
Husserliana XII, The Hague, M. Nijhoff, 1970, p. 71. 
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and in first instance in the shape of similarity-variation. This latter, 
further conclusion, would precede the one of contingency. 
 
The truly question is now: what should “contingency-variation” 
phenomenologically mean? One usually asserts that it varies the so-
called contingent features of an object up to the impossibility itself to 
further vary them, in such a way facing an invariable and essential 
feature26. Here too we cannot but raise two orders of objections, 
textual as well as theoretical.  
The first is that all the texts usually quoted in order to support the 
idea of such method do not seem to offer a whatsoever proof in 
favour of it. Be it the Fourth Cartesian Meditation or § 98 of Formal and 
Transcendental Logic, our impression is that this so-called “contin- 
gency-variation” does not appear altogether. And it cannot appear at 
all. Considering for example the corresponding pages from the Logic, 
where Husserl certainly does not mention the role of similarity but 
where he does not mention too any form of “contingency-variation”: 
he undeniably asserts the factuality of the starting point of the opera- 
tion, but also its validity as Exempel and thus of the consciousness of 
exemplarity itself only on which that variation can be performed27. In 
§ 34 of the Fourth Meditation Husserl explicitly refers to the necessity 
of moving into “the realm of unrealities” from a starting Exempel of 
perception of a table; he makes no reference to the role of similarity, 
but it is the phenomenological meaning of the Exempel that we have 
to stress28. 
For – and this concerns on the contrary the second order of 
objections – it is by virtue of such Exempel that the idea itself of a 
“contingency-variation” has phenomenologically no sense: at the 
very moment in fact in which we switch from the starting cons- 
ciousness of something individual to the one of exemplarity, we have 
already left the ground only on whose basis whatever discourse on 
the notion of contingency has sense. In the realm of possibilities 
disclosed by the Exempel (a possibility among others) and by its 
corresponding consciousness of Beliebigkeit the contingency is already 
set apart. It remains on this side of the exemplarisches Bewusstsein29. 
                                                     
26. Paolo Volonté, Husserls Phänomenologie der Imagination. Zur Funktion der Phantasie bei der 
Konstitution der Erkenntnis, Freiburg, München, Verlag Karl Alber, 1997, notably pp. 276-287: 
“Die Methode der Variation besteht nun darin, daβ wir unsere empirische Erfahrung ganz 
willkürlich nach allen möglichen Gestalten variieren, bis wir die Grenzen finden, jenseits deren 
es nicht mehr möglich ist, von einer Wahrnehmung zu sprechen”. 
27. Husserl, Formale und transzendentale Logik. Versuch einer Kritik der logischen Vernunft, hrsgg. 
von P. Janssen, Husserliana XVII, Den Haag, M. Nijhoff, 1974, pp. 254-255. 
28. Husserl, Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträger, hrsgg. von S. Strasser, Den Haag, M. 
Nijhoff, 1950, p. 104 and p. 107. 
29. Ms. A III 11, 31b: “Jetzt ist dieser Tisch da charakterisiert als Exempel, ihm haftet diese 
Beliebigkeit an, er ist als dieser da bewusst, aber gleichgültig [o.i.]”. 
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If this interpretation is right, if then we are not allowed to speak of 
two different physiognomies of eidetic-variation and if there exists 
only a unique method of variation (aiming at the eidos), the one of 
similarity, that entails two consequences: 
 
1) one cannot propose an interpretation of eidetic-variation (in 
terms of “contingency-variation”) as “falsification”30. Not that the 
idea of falsification cannot play a very important role; the problem 
arises when we pretend to save the “contingency-variation” – because 
of its eventual ambiguities and difficulties31 – by interpreting it as 
falsification: for it is the idea itself of a “contingency-variation” that 
we are questioning here; 
2) but if there is no “contingency-variation”; if there exists only a 
unique method of variation (similarity-variation) which does entail 
no inner criterion to point out its terminus ad quem, we face, 
methodologically and according to the hitherto reasoning, a certain 
impossibility of eidos. 
 
In one of his loose notes Fink reports a question on variation asked 
Husserl by a student, Walter Sachs, during a seminar in Freiburg: Is 
not the outcome already anticipated by the starting point? [...] If at 
the beginning I have not already conceived of the outcome, is not the 
universality that I provide through variation an empirical universa- 
lity?32. The alternative seems once more to lie between the anticipa- 
tion of the eidos – which would render the whole operation simply 
superfluous – and its impossibility under the shape of a mere empi- 
rical generality. 





                                                     
30 As recently argued by R. Sowa, “Essences and Eidetic Laws in Edmund Husserl’s Descriptive 
Eidetics”, The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy, 2007. 
31 See Ingarden’s remarks on the Fourth Cartesian Meditation: “die Möglichkeit des Übergangs 
von einer empirisch gegebenen Einzelheit, z. B. einer ganz bestimmten Perzeption, setzt bei der 
Methode der Variation voraus, was wir als ‘konstant’ und was ‘variabel’ nehmen sollen […]. 
[E]he man zu einer eidetischen Analyse mittels der Methode der Variation herantritt, muβ man, 
um überhaupt die möglichen Untersuchungsrichtungen bestimmt zu haben, zunächst auf die 
erste der ‘essentialen Fragen’, d. h. auf die Frage: ‘Was ist das?’ eine bestimmte und richtige 
Antwort haben. Aber gerade auf diese Frage ist dann am schwierigsten zu antworten, wenn 
man von dem zu untersuchenden Gegenstand doch nichts Eidetisches weiβ, das heiβt, wenn 
man noch keine eidetische Analyse durchgeführt hat”, Roman Ingarden, “Bemerkungen zu den 
Méditations Cartésiennes”, in Schriften zur Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls, hrsgg. von W. 
Galewicz, Gesammelte Werke 5, Tübingen, Max Niemeyer, 1998, pp. 89-90. 
32 Eugen Fink, Phänomenologische Werkstatt. Teilband 1: Die Doktorarbeit und erste Assistenzjahre bei 
Husserl, hrsgg. von R. Bruzina, Freiburg, München, Verlag Karl Alber, 2006, p. 98, p. 14. 
